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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nancy Leong* 
Citizens blinded by pepper spray during a peaceful protest, fired 
unceremoniously from their jobs for political reasons, or denied access to the 
ballot box based on the color of their skin often rest their hopes for 
remediation on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statutory provision imposes liability 
for constitutional violations perpetrated by government actors, allowing 
plaintiffs to seek monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief 
from the individual officers who violated their rights. 
While the Supreme Court has sanctioned § 1983 as a device for 
plaintiffs' recovery, it has also expressed reservations about imposing 
financial liability on government officers. Officers may encounter an 
incentive not to act for fear of§ 1983 liability or may unfairly face damages 
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for their inability to predict whether their actions were constitutional. 1 The 
Court has therefore developed the doctrine of qualified immunity-which 
imposes liability only if "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted"2-and has created a 
procedural framework for its implementation. Under this framework, "the 
first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated 
on the facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the 
question whether the right was clearly established must be considered on a 
more specific level."3 The Supreme Court first indicated a preference for 
this ordering of the issues in Siegert v. Gilley, decided in 1991,4 and then 
made that approach mandatory in Saucier v. Katz, decided in 2001. s But in 
2009-a mere eight years after Saucier-the Court overruled that case in 
Pearson v. Callahan, holding that the ordering of the issues should remain 
discretionary rather than mandatory. 6 
Pearson's holding has, if anything, intensified the debate over the 
proper procedural framework for addressing qualified immunity claims. 
Courts and commentators have justified the requirement that courts resolve 
the constitutional question first-which I will refer to as the "sequencing" 
approach-by asserting the need to clarify constitutional law. 7 If courts 
repeatedly hold that a particular right is not clearly established, without ever 
defining the contours of that right, then government actors may be able to 
repeatedly engage in unconstitutional conduct without ever incurring 
liability for their actions. Sequencing, the argument goes, is therefore 
necessary for two reasons. First, it clarifies the law so that police officers 
may avoid future violations if their conduct is held unconstitutional. And 
second, it ensures that, in the future, a similarly-wronged plaintiff would be 
able to recover if she had, in fact, suffered a violation of her constitutional 
rights. Although authorities have suggested that the law may be clarified via 
1. This concern for officers' willingness to act and financial security is somewhat misplaced 
given that the vast majority of jurisdictions have statutory indemnification provisions or offer 
indemnification to employees by policy or collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., 
Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and 
Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797,819 & n.89 (2007) (collecting commentary). Of course, such 
indemnification merely shifts our concern for overdeterrence onto the government employer, which 
may consequently train its employees to act with caution given its own potential financial liability. 
See id. at 856-57. 
2. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). 
3. /d. at 200. 
4. 500 u.s. 226 (1991). 
5. 533 U.S. at 202. 
6. 129 S. Ct. 808, 813 (2009). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81. 
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other mechanisms-suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, for example-
many areas of the law are not susceptible to such suits. 8 
The sequencing approach, however, has met with its share of criticism. 
Sequencing requires courts to resolve difficult constitutional questions in 
situations where, previously, they might simply have granted qualified 
immunity on the ground that the relevant law was not clearly established. 
From an efficiency standpoint, therefore, sequencing is costly, requiring 
courts to allocate time and resources to deciding complex constitutional 
questions. Moreover, sequencing risks premature and poorly reasoned 
adjudication of these complex questions, particularly because the Supreme 
Court has indicated that the qualified immunity issue should be resolved as 
early in litigation as possible. Sequencing also creates a procedural 
conundrum: where a government official receives an unfavorable 
constitutional ruling but is granted qualified immunity, sequencing insulates 
that unfavorable constitutional decision from appellate review because the 
government is, technically, a prevailing party. Finally, as a jurisprudential 
matter, sequencing contravenes the well-established and oft-quoted norm 
favoring avoidance of unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. 
Before Pearson, four sitting Justices explicitly questioned the wisdom of 
sequencing on all these grounds, most vigorously Justice Breyer, who, in 
2007, announced that if it were his choice he "would end the failed Saucier 
experiment now."9 
No one, however, has yet addressed the empirical underpinnings of the 
sequencing debate. 10 Does sequencing in fact result in the clarification of 
the scope of constitutional rights, as its proponents claim? And if so, has 
8. For example, a plaintiff may lack standing to seek injunctive relief because he is unable to 
show a reasonable probability of future injury. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 
(1983), the Court held that an individual who was subjected to a choke hold during a traffic stop 
could not sue for injunctive relief because he was unable to show that he would be choke held in the 
future. Indeed, this problem permeates the Fourth Amendment excessive force context, where 
plaintiffs injured in a particular situation are generally unable to show that a similar situation would 
arise in the future. See Pamela S. Karl an, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 
FORDHAML.REV.l913, 1917(2007). 
9. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2642 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring); see infra text 
accompanying notes 40-78 for a discussion of other Justices' criticisms of Saucier. 
I 0. See Rosenthal, supra note I, at 859 n.241 ("I am unaware of any empirical evidence that the 
doctrine of qualified immunity has operated to inhibit the development of constitutional law."). 
While Professor Healy has compiled and categorized cases decided during the two years following 
Saucier, his work examines only a single time frame and, therefore, cannot capture Saucier's effect 
on the course of constitutional decision making. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary 
Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 930, app. (2005); see also infra notes 101-106 and 
accompanying text (discussing in detail Healy's work and its limitations). 
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such clarification resulted in the acknowledgement or denial of 
constitutional rights? My paper therefore provides an empirical analysis of 
the consequences of sequencing. Through the research presented here, I 
sought to determine the results of the forced adjudication of constitutional 
questions. 
My methodology was straightforward. I examined a random sample of 
federal district courts cases in which a qualified immunity defense was 
raised during three time intervals: (1) the two years before Siegert, before 
the Court had indicated any preference for sequencing; (2) the two years 
before Saucier, before the Court had made clear that sequencing was 
mandatory; and (3) the calendar years 2006 and 2007. I then did the same 
for federal appellate cases within the same three time intervals. 
My research yielded both expected and unexpected results. In the two 
years before Siegert, courts avoided the constitutional question in over a 
quarter of the cases in which the government officer raised a qualified 
immunity defense. Unsurprisingly, given the Supreme Court's increasing 
insistence on the sequencing approach, the likelihood of avoidance 
decreased by half for cases decided in the two years before Saucier, and fell 
below 5% in 2006 and 2007. We might expect this decrease in avoidance to 
correspond to a relatively similar increase in the percentage of constitutional 
questions decided for plaintiffs and for defendants-after all, the previously-
avoided constitutional questions are likely to be the difficult cases, where 
courts preferred simply to grant immunity rather than grapple with the 
constitutional issue. Surprisingly, this was not the case. The marked decline 
in avoidance did not correspond to any statistically significant increase in the 
recognition of new constitutional rights. Rather, the decline in avoidance 
was accompanied only by a sharp increase in the percentage of cases in 
which courts explicitly held that no constitutional violation had occurred. 
My research therefore counters the argument that mandatory sequencing 
is critical to remediating civil rights violations because it promotes the 
articulation of new constitutional rights. To the contrary, my research shows 
that mandatory sequencing does not correspond to any increase in the rate at 
which courts find for plaintiffs in the qualified immunity context. 
Sequencing leads to the articulation of more constitutional law, but not the 
expansion of constitutional rights. 
After explaining my research methodology and describing my findings 
in detail, this article explores possible explanations for this phenomenon. I 
contend that, given the longstanding norm within our legal system that 
where there is a right, there must be a remedy, judges are deeply 
uncomfortable with the notion of acknowledging a violation yet denying 
relief. Cognitive psychology research supports this notion: judges are 
reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional violation where they subsequently 
intend to grant qualified immunity because such a result induces a state of 
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psychological discomfort known as cognitive dissonance. In an effort to 
avoid such dissonance, therefore, judges may--entirely unintentionally-
allow their beliefs about whether a government officer is entitled to qualified 
immunity to influence their analysis of whether a constitutional violation 
occurred at all. I then explore the long-term consequences for the 
development of the law resulting from a mandatory sequencing approach. 
As I was in the process of conducting the research presented in this 
article, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pearson v. Callahan, and sua 
sponte requested that the parties brief whether Saucier should be 
overruled. 11 After briefing and oral argument, a unanimous Court then held 
that overruling was appropriate. 12 The empirical research I present supports 
the Court's decision to overturn Saucier's mandatory sequencing regime, but 
I believe that the judiciary would have been better served by a decision 
providing more specific guidance to lower courts regarding when 
sequencing is and is not appropriate. I will therefore also briefly describe an 
approach that lower courts might adopt to determine whether they should 
exercise their discretion to rule on the merits of a constitutional issue. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
With 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enacted in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act, 13 Congress created a civil damages remedy against any person acting 
under color of state law who causes "the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." A plaintiff who 
demonstrates the deprivation of such a constitutional or statutory right, 
however, may not be entitled to recovery if a defendant government official 
proves himself eligible for qualified immunity, a judge-created doctrine that 
excuses public officials from liability for illegal behavior if a reasonable 
official would not have known that the behavior in question violated clearly 
established law. As the Supreme Court explained in Pierson v. Ray, its first 
enunciation of the qualified immunity doctrine, "a police officer is not 
charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law." 14 
Therefore, with respect to the police officers sued for falsely arresting civil 
rights demonstrators in Pierson, "if the jury found that the officers 
reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a 
II. 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008). 
12. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
13. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
14. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
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verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in fact 
unconstitutional." 15 
Subsequently, the Court cited efficiency concerns in dispensing with the 
subjective "good faith" component of the qualified immunity analysis. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald explained that subjective good faith is a factual matter 
best suited for jury resolution and, as such, "frequently has proved 
incompatible with our admonition ... that insubstantial claims should not 
proceed to trial." 16 The standard for qualified immunity, therefore, became 
purely objective: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known." 17 
For several years following Harlow, the Court remained noncommittal 
about the structure of the immunity analysis. 18 It first introduced the notion 
of the qualified immunity inquiry as bipartite and sequential in Siegert v. 
Gilley, in which a clinical psychologist brought a due process claim against 
his former supervisor at a federal government hospital for giving him a poor 
recommendation that ultimately resulted in a denial of the credential 
necessary to work at a military hospital. 19 The D.C. Circuit had assumed, 
without deciding, that the plaintiff had made out a constitutional violation, 
but had granted qualified immunity to the defendant on the ground that the 
law was not clearly established. 20 The Court stated that it had "granted 
certiorari in order to clarify the analytical structure under which a claim of 
qualified immunity should be addressed," holding that "petitioner's claim 
failed at an analytically earlier stage of the inquiry into qualified immunity: 
His allegations, even if accepted as true, did not state a claim for violation of 
any rights secured to him under the United States Constitution."21 The 
Court's rationale offered little insight into this holding. Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion described the determination of whether the right exists as a 
"necessary concomitant" to the question of whether that right is clearly 
15. /d. 
16. 457 u.s. 800,815-16 {1982). 
17. /d.at818. 
18. See MitchelJ v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985) (noting that appelJate courts addressing 
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity rulings "need not ... determine whether the plaintiff's 
alJegations actually state a claim" but rather need determine only "whether the legal norms alJegedly 
violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions"); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (emphasizing that "courts have considerable discretion 
in conforming their decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular cases"); see also John 
M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil 
Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403,415 n.59 {1999) (collecting cases). 
19. 500 u.s. 226,228-29 {1991). 
20. /d. at 230-31. 
21. !d. at 227,231 (citation omitted). 
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established, and held that "[ d]ecision of this purely legal question permits 
courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test.without requiring a 
defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and 
time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits."22 But whether 
the law is clearly established is a different question from whether the law 
was violated: the latter asks what the law is, while the former merely asks 
whether a reasonable officer would have had notice of the state of the law. 23 
Moreover, an initial determination of whether a violation took place does 
nothing to "weed out" suits in which the plaintiff will lose; indeed, given 
that the question of whether a violation took place may depend on disputed 
factual issues requiring jury resolution, thus delaying, rather than expediting, 
a grant of qualified immunity. 
Following Siegert, the Court alluded to the notion of sequencing but did 
not elucidate the approach described in that case. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Souter explained in 1998 in County of Sacramento v. Lewis: 
[A]s we have held, the better approach to resolving cases in which 
the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first 
whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional 
right at all. Normally, it is only then that a court should ask whether 
the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time of 
the events in question. 24 
Justice Souter's description of the doctrine is carefully couched in non-
absolute terms: The sequencing approach is the "better approach," and 
should be followed "normally," but is not mandatory. And his justification 
for sequencing is party-neutral: "[I]f the policy of avoidance were always 
followed in favor of ruling on qualified immunity whenever there was no 
clearly settled constitutional rule of primary conduct, standards of official 
conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials 
and individuals."25 In short, Justice Souter reasoned that sequencing is 
necessary to benefit defendant government officers and plaintiff citizens 
alike. 
22. ld. at 232. 
23. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1249, 1278 n.86 (2006). 
24. 523 U.S. 833,841 n.5 (1998). 
25. ld. 
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Writing for the Court the following term in Wilson v. Layne, Justice 
Rehnquist reiterated, without explanation, his claim that deciding the 
constitutional question before the question of whether the law was clearly 
established facilitates early resolution of the qualified immunity issue. 26 But 
like Justice Souter, he also emphasized the value of articulating legal 
standards: "Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the 
qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for 
official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public."27 
One reading of this statement is that, if courts make the law clear, 
government officials will better be able to tailor their actions to the 
applicable legal standards-thus both protecting themselves from suit and 
better serving the public. A logical extension of the statement, however, is 
that the law will be sufficiently clear to allow plaintiffs to overcome a 
qualified immunity defense if defendant officers fail to alter their conduct. 
In the wake of Siegert, Sacramento, and Wilson, a split arose among the 
federal courts. Many courts read those three decisions to hold that they 
should generally decide the constitutional issue first. 28 A few courts even 
read the decisions to require sequencing. 29 Other courts, however, 
maintained that the option of bypassing the constitutional question survived 
those cases. 30 The courts that acknowledged the benefits of sequencing 
generally focused on its law-elaboration function. For instance, the Seventh 
Circuit justified a decision to address the constitutional issue first "[i]n order 
that legal doctrine may continue to evolve in common law fashion."31 
In 200 I, however, the legal landscape changed with Saucier v. Katz, in 
which the Court made sequencing mandatory. 32 Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the majority, held that initial decision of the constitutional issue is 
required: 
As we shall explain, the first inquiry must be whether a 
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged; 
second, assuming the violation is established, the question whether 
26. 526 U.S. 603,609 (1999). 
27. !d. 
28. See Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881,884 (7th Cir. 2001) (vacating jury verdict on ground 
that no constitutional violation occurred without addressing qualified immunity question, while 
noting that "[w]hether (the sequencing approach] is absolute may be doubted"); Kalka v. Hawk, 215 
F.3d 90,94-98 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244,245 (2d Cir. 1999). 
29. See Cline v. Binder, No. 98-2433, 1999 WL 507199 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (unpublished 
table decision); McCall v. Williams, 59 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.S.C. 1999). 
30. See Spivey v. Elliot, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498-99 (lith Cir. 1995); Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 
597, 606 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994). 
31. Pearson, 237 F.3d at 884. 
32. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Commentators have also read Saucier to make sequencing mandatory. 
See, e.g., Healy, supra note 10, at 880--81 (noting that Saucier made sequencing mandatory). 
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the right was clearly established must be considered on a more 
specific level than recognized by the Court of Appeals. 33 
Likewise, "A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue 
must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most 
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the 
officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial 
inquiry."34 In support of mandatory sequencing, the Court emphasized that 
sequencing was "necessary to set forth principles which will become the 
basis for a [future] holding that a right is clearly established."35 In other 
words, it was concerned about future plaintiffs being able to recover. The 
Court also--still without explanation-reiterated the link between the 
sequencing approach and the early resolution of the qualified immunity 
issue. 36 
Between Saucier and Pearson, the Court generally adhered to the 
sequencing approach37 and for justification gestured at the importance of 
clarifying the law. 38 Yet the Court also once ignored its own sequencing 
requirement without acknowledging that it did so. In a per curiam opinion 
in Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that 
the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment, thereby granting 
qualified immunity while "express[ing] no view as to the correctness of the 
Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself."39 But the 
Court also stated: "We have no occasion in this case to reconsider our 
instruction in Saucier that lower courts decide the constitutional question 
prior to deciding the qualified immunity question."40 And in Scott v. Harris, 
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia joined by seven other Justices, 
33. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. 
34. /d. at 201. 
35. !d. 
36. !d. at 200-0 I. 
37. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2624 (2007); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 
(2007); L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 
(2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736-39 
(2002). 
38. For example, in Bunting v. Mellen, Justice Scalia's dissent from the denial of certiorari 
reemphasized the law-clarification function of the sequencing approach. He explained that the initial 
resolution of the constitutional question "is not mere dictum in the ordinary sense, since the whole 
reason we require it to be set forth (despite the availability of qualified immunity) is to clarifY the 
law and thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in future cases." Bunting v. 
Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023-24 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
39. 543 u.s. 194, 198 (2004). 
40. /d. at 198 n.3. 
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hinted at doubts "regarding the wisdom of Saucier's decision to make the 
threshold inquiry mandatory, especially in cases where the constitutional 
question is relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question relatively 
straightforward."41 Again, however, the Court explained that it "need not 
address the wisdom of Saucier in this case" because the constitutional 
question was easily decided, and thus sequencing was the best approach 
regardless whether it was mandatory. 42 
The Court broadcast its doubts about Saucier when it granted certiorari 
in Pearson v. Callahan. 43 While the case involved a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to a warrantless search on the basis of "consent once removed," 
the Justices also instructed the parties to brief a question that neither side had 
raised: "Whether the Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz should be 
overruled?"44 The Court ultimately answered that question in the 
affirmative. 45 Evaluation of its decision requires consideration of the 
jurisprudential and practical consequences of sequencing, and I will outline 
these consequences in the next section. 
III. CRITIQUING SEQUENCING 
Saucier was a lightning rod for criticism-indeed, Judge Leval of the 
Second Circuit has described it as "involv[ing] so many and such serious 
problems that I am not sure where to begin."46 At a jurisprudential level, the 
primary criticism is, as Justice Breyer explained in Morse, that sequencing 
fails to "adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding unnecessary 
decision of constitutional questions."47 Simply put, avoidance may be 
thought of as a "last resort rule": "[E]ven if all other jurisdictional and 
justiciability obstacles are surmounted, federal courts still must avoid a 
constitutional issue if there is any other ground upon which to render a final 
judgment."48 
The primary justification for avoidance is rooted in the principle of 
separation of powers. The concern that one branch will "encroach on the 
domain of another"49 requires that judges abstain from passing upon the 
41. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4. 
42. !d. 
43. 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008). 
44. !d. at 1702-03 (2008) (citation omitted). 
45. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
46. See, e.g., Leva!, supra note 23, at 1277. 
47. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2007). 
48. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003, 1025 
(1994); see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, 
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."). 
49. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 355 (quoting Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)). 
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constitutionality of statutes unless no alternative basis for decision is 
available. But such concern is tied closely to the fact that a statute is a 
legislative product, and therefore its invalidation by the judiciary risks 
undermining majority rule without political accountability. 50 In the 
qualified immunity context, however, the acts in question are those of 
individual government officers-members of the executive branch-rather 
than of the legislature. Thus, the underlying justification for avoidance is 
surely less compelling in the context of adjudicating qualified immunity 
disputes. 51 
Some commentators have also argued that avoidance is desirable 
because courts may lack the incentive to give due consideration to an issue 
that has no effect on the outcome of the case before it. 52 But this assumption 
is both lacking in empirical support and questionable as a general 
proposition because courts experience considerable scrutiny of each 
sentence in their opinions. Such scrutiny likely provides an incentive to 
decide constitutional issues properly even when those issues do not 
determine the outcome of the case. Relatedly, commentators have 
contended that individual litigants may fail to adequately brief and argue 
constitutional issues when there is a chance a court may avoid those issues. 53 
But particularly in the qualified immunity context, the failure to brief the 
constitutional issue may be dispositive if the court finds there was no 
constitutional violation-it would seem, therefore, that both parties have a 
substantial incentive to argue that issue vigorously. 
In any event, the principle of avoidance is not ironclad: courts routinely 
decide constitutional questions unnecessarily in other contexts. For 
instance, harmless error doctrine instructs courts first to decide whether an 
error actually occurred, and only then to determine whether such error was 
harmless. 54 Similarly, under the relevant standard for habeas corpus relief, a 
court need only determine whether a state court's decision "was contrary to, 
50. One commentator has suggested that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" arising from 
avoidance may be overstated, explaining that our system of government is "dialogic," and so a 
court's constitutional pronouncement will seldom be the final word. Kloppenberg, supra note 48, at 
1037-42. 
51. See Greabe, supra note 18, at 418-24. 
52. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 10, at 920--21. 
53. See id. 
54. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 ("Harmless error analysis is triggered 
only after the reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed."). The Court's instruction 
with regard to harmless error responded to a practice by lower courts of withholding judgment as to 
whether a constitutional error occurred and simply holding that any such error was harmless. See, 
e.g., United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."55 But courts 
frequently decide the relevant question of federal law rather than simply 
stating that the state decision did not contravene clearly established 
principles. 56 
In light of the lack of separation of powers concerns present here, as 
well as the various exceptions to avoidance doctrine throughout 
constitutional law, I view the general rule of avoidance as insufficient to 
automatically invalidate the sequencing approach. Nonetheless, the 
avoidance norm is so firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that any 
deviation from that norm deserves careful consideration. 
The mandatory sequencing approach also potentially undermines the 
process of appellate review. 57 If a court holds that a defendant violated the 
Constitution but then grants qualified immunity to that defendant, 
sequencing may "immunize an incorrect constitutional holding from further 
review."58 As a prevailing party, the defendant cannot appeal the 
constitutional ruling, even if it believes the ruling is incorrect and the 
consequences of that ruling are unfavorable for both that defendant and 
others who are similarly situated. So if the plaintiffs decide not to appeal the 
qualified immunity determination, the constitutional decision remains 
enshrined in the caselaw. 
The Court's denial of certiorari in Bunting v. Mellen provides a prime 
example of this difficulty. Indeed, Justice Scalia, dissenting from the denial, 
described the situation as a "perceived procedural tangle of the Court's own 
making."59 Bunting arose from an Establishment Clause challenge to the 
Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) invocation of God during its Supper Roll 
Call ceremony, brought by cadets who sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief as well as monetary damages. 60 After prevailing in district court, the 
cadets graduated from VMI, thereby mooting their claims to declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 61 The Fourth Circuit held that the invocation was 
unconstitutional, but granted qualified immunity to the VMI officials. 62 The 
55. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(l) (2000). 
56. See Healy, supra note 10, at 886 (collecting cases). 
57. The frequency with which this situation actually occurs is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. See infra Part IV. 
58. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 202 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
("[Sequencing] can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulated from 
review." (citing Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1025 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari))). 
59. Bunting, 541 U.S. at I 022 (Scalia, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
60. !d. at 1022-23. 
61. !d. at 1022. 
62. !d. 
678 
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
Court then denied VMI' s petition for certiorari in part because the Court will 
not entertain an appeal by a party on an issue on which that party prevailed, 
and VMI had technically prevailed on the monetary damages action via the 
favorable qualified immunity ruling it received. 63 Such a result is 
particularly perverse because VMI almost certainly viewed the constitutional 
issue-the preservation of its traditional invocation practice-as greater in 
importance than the damages immunity of its officials. 
This sequencing-created problem could potentially be resolved by an 
exception to the rule against appeals initiated by prevailing parties. In 
protest of the Bunting certiorari denial, Justice Scalia wrote, "I think it plain 
that this general rule should not apply where a favorable judgment on 
qualified-immunity grounds would deprive a party of an opportunity to 
appeal the unfavorable (and often more significant) constitutional 
determination." 64 But neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal 
courts have acknowledged such an exception. 65 So under the current 
sequencing framework, any defendant that loses on the merits but prevails 
on qualified immunity grounds has the potential to find itself in the position 
of VMI: saddled with an adverse constitutional ruling it has no power to 
appeal because it is, technically, a prevailing party. 
Mandatory sequencing also engenders a host of undesirable practical 
consequences, not least the requirement that courts grapple unnecessarily 
with complex constitutional issues. Several Justices have voiced concern 
that the Saucier rule "rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult 
constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the 
decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case 
before the court."66 The Court's reluctance to endorse unnecessary decision 
of "difficult" questions embodies two concerns. 
63. !d. at 1023. 
64. /d. 
65. See, e.g., Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (postulating that "government 
defendants [as the prevailing parties] will ... have no opportunity to appeal for review of the newly 
declared constitutional right in the higher courts"). 
66. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (Breyer, 1., concurring). Justices Breyer, 
Ginsberg, and Scalia have consistently raised the unnecessary decision of difficult constitutional 
questions as an argument against mandatory sequencing. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 
2640 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In order to avoid resolving the 
fractious underlying constitutional question, we need only decide a different question that this case 
presents, the question of 'qualified immunity."'); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 n.4 (2007) 
(Scalia, J.) (expressing doubt about sequencing "especially in cases where the constitutional question 
is relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question relatively straightforward"); id. at 1780 
(Breyer, 1., concurring); L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("Consequently, regardless of the proper answer to the 
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The first concern is that inefficiency will ensue from courts expending 
the time and resources to puzzle through difficult constitutional questions. 
Justice Breyer has argued that "when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid 
'order of battle' makes little administrative sense,"67 adding that sequencing 
sometimes "will require lower courts unnecessarily to answer difficult 
constitutional questions, thereby wasting judicial resources."68 Such 
inefficiency is compounded by the fact that courts often confront the 
qualified immunity question early in the course of litigation, spurred on by 
the Court's insistence that qualified immunity should be resolved as 
expeditiously as possible "so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided 
where the defense is dispositive."69 In a significant number of cases, 
therefore, courts decide these difficult constitutional questions on a motion 
to dismiss-indeed, my research reveals that, in 2006 and 2007, 24.6% of 
cases in which a court addressed a qualified immunity issue took place on a 
motion to dismiss. 70 At these early stages of the proceedings the 
constitutional issues are more likely to be insufficiently briefed by parties 
struggling to meet ambitious filing deadlines, so courts will therefore have to 
invest even more judicial resources in compensating for these shortcomings 
with their own research. 71 
The efficiency problem, while serious in its own right, also segues into a 
broader worry: that in their effort to decide difficult constitutional questions 
with the limited time and resources available to them, courts will make bad 
constitutional question, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. I would reverse on that 
ground and disavow the unwise practice of deciding constitutional questions in advance of the 
necessity for doing so."). 
67. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201--02 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.) 
(citing Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1025 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). 
68. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
69. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 
(1991) (per curiam) ("(W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions 
at the earliest possible stage in litigation."). 
70. Of these cases, in 21.5% the qualified immunity issue was raised on a motion to dismiss, and 
in 3.1% that issue was raised on a motion styled in the alternative as a motion to dismiss or a motion 
for summary judgment. In addition, 73.8% of cases involved qualified immunity raised on a motion 
for summary judgment, bringing the total of cases in which a court addressed the qualified immunity 
issue on either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment to approximately 98%. For a 
description of my research methodology, see infra Part IV .A. See Leva!, supra note 23, at 1275 
("We dismiss a large number of [qualified immunity] cases, probably the great majority, at the outset 
because it is immediately apparent that there are no rulings establishing the unconstitutionality of the 
officer's conduct."). 
71. Indeed, as Professor Ravenell has observed, plaintiffs may not have pled a violation of 
clearly established law, given that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the burden 
falls on the defendant to raise. Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should 
Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving §1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VJLL. L. 
REV. 135, 164-65 (2007). Judgment on a motion to dismiss is particularly premature under such 
circumstances. 
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law. 72 Justice Breyer expressed this concern in County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, when he wrote in concurrence that "[Siegert] should not be read to 
deny lower courts the flexibility, in appropriate cases, to decide [§ 1983] 
claims on the basis of qualified immunity, and thereby avoid wrestling with 
constitutional issues that are either difficult or poorly presented."73 Justice 
Stevens, concurring in the judgment, likewise registered an objection to the 
Court's statement that sequencing is "normally" the "better approach." He 
argued: "That is sound advice when the answer to the constitutional question 
is clear. When, however, the question is both difficult and unresolved, I 
believe it wiser to adhere to the policy of avoiding the unnecessary 
adjudication of constitutional questions."74 Thus, without denying the 
concern for articulating legal principles that underlies the sequencing 
approach, Justices Breyer and Stevens express concern for the quality of the 
law articulated. No law, they suggest, is better than bad law. 75 And their 
concern that courts will do a poor job of articulating constitutional principles 
seems intuitively reasonable if courts are forced to make law under 
conditions of constrained resources and insufficient briefing. 
But the Justices' reasoning also exposes a quandary. Although the 
objection to deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily is that doing so 
will require courts to resolve difficult constitutional questions, the entire 
reason for courts to address these questions is to clarify difficult areas of the 
law for the benefit of government officials and public citizens. Deciding the 
constitutional question only when the answer is already "clear," as Justice 
Stevens recommends, would do little to clarify the constitutional standards 
72. At first blush, this discussion may seem to contradict the previous discussion of 
constitutional avoidance. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. My point with respect to 
avoidance, however, is simply that one cannot generalize about the behavior of judges and parties: 
we cannot assume that judges will decide a constitutional issue in a cursory fashion simply because 
it is unnecessary to the result, nor can we assume that parties will brief a constitutional issue 
inadequately simply because the court may not reach that issue. Therefore, a universal principle of 
avoidance predicated on these assumptions is unwarranted. Here, by contrast, I wish to raise the 
possibility that the difficulty of the constitutional question and the thoroughness of the briefing may 
at times make decision of the constitutional issue difficult and time-consuming for judges. 
73. 523 U.S. 833, 858-59 (Breyer, J., concurring); see Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 
(2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Sometimes ... the order-of-battle rule will spawn constitutional 
rulings in areas of law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity."); 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2617 n.lO (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.) ("As I have elsewhere indicated, in appropriate cases, I 
would allow courts to move directly to the second inquiry."). 
74. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
75. Judge Leva! also raises the possibility that the defendant may not be sufficiently invested in 
the constitutional issue to brief the issue in a manner helpful to the court. Leval, supra note 23, at 
1278. 
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applicable to government officials' conduct. Nor would such a decision 
increase the number of injured plaintiffs who could recover, because if a 
particular constitutional principle is already "clear," then any government 
official who acted in contravention of that principle would already be unable 
to raise the defense of qualified immunity. 
The confluence of jurisprudential and practical problems outlined here 
has led four Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Scalia-to state 
explicitly that sequencing should not be mandatory. 76 And, responding to 
these Justices' cues, lower courts have not uniformly adhered to the 
sequencing approach. The First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have, 
in some instances, deviated from sequencing, although they have not 
articulated clear standards for when such deviation is appropriate. 77 And 
several other courts have chosen to disregard the sequencing requirement in 
select unpublished opinions. 78 
Sequencing proponents, however, claim that all these objections are 
outweighed by the law-elaboration function of sequencing. And certainly 
compelling considerations favor resolving a constitutional issue even when 
doing so is unnecessary because the court would ultimately grant qualified 
immunity. Rather obviously, if a court skips over the constitutional question 
and simply grants qualified immunity, then a constitutional question 
controversial enough to engender litigation remains unanswered. 79 Negative 
consequences ensue for both governments and individuals. Governments 
lack guidance in training their employees and crafting policies to conform to 
constitutional standards. And for citizens, a potential category of wrong 
76. Indeed, a fifth Justice presently seated on the Court-Justice Kennedy--concurred in the 
judgment in Siegert to state: 
I do not, however, agree that the Court of Appeals [should not have avoided the 
constitutional issue]. The Court of Appeals adopted the altogether normal procedure of 
deciding the case before it on the ground that appeared to offer the most direct and 
appropriate resolution, and one argued by the parties. If it is plain that a plaintiff's 
required malice allegations are insufficient but there is some doubt as to the constitutional 
right asserted, it seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues to tell the trial and appellate 
courts that they should resolve the constitutional question first. 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Given that Justice Kennedy 
authored Saucier, however, we may reasonably infer that he has now renounced his previously-
stated attachment to "the usual ordering of issues." 
77. See, e.g., Hatfield-Bermudez v. Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); Roberts 
v. Ward, 468 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 2006); Koch v. Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002); Pearson v. 
Ramos, 237 F.3d 881,884 (7th Cir. 2001). 
78. See, e.g., Corbett v. Garland, 228 F. App'x 525 (6th Cir. 2007); Lathan v. Thompson, 251 F. 
App'x. 665 (lith Cir. 2007); Olagues v. Kousharian, 177 F. App'x 537 (9th Cir. 2006); Bruton v. 
Paesani, 162 F. App'x 151 (3d Cir. 2006); Hill v. Fleming, 173 F. App'x 664 (lOth Cir. 2006); 
Rolen v. City of Brownfield, 182 F. App'x 362 (5th Cir. 2006). 
79. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
("That constitutional determination is not mere dictum in the ordinary sense, since the whole reason 
we require it to be set forth (despite the availability of qualified immunity) is to clarify the law and 
thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in future cases."). 
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remains, troublingly, irremediable for the indefinite future. Without 
clarification of the law, no future plaintiff, even one who has suffered an 
identical injury, can overcome a government official's defense that the 
relevant law was not clearly established. 80 This concern is not theoretical. 
Writing before the Court's decision in Saucier, John Greabe has argued 
compellingly in favor of resolving constitutional issues, collecting numerous 
cases where courts' failure to clarify novel constitutional questions left 
officials uncertain about the standards that should govern their conduct and 
potentially wronged citizens without recourse to money damages. 81 
Sequencing dissidents have struggled to marshal arguments to counter 
the claim that, if courts repeatedly avoid difficult constitutional questions, 
the law will remain unclear and many plaintiffs will remain unable to 
recover. Justice Stevens has attempted to allay this concern by asserting that 
such contentions may be addressed in other contexts such as "adversarial 
suits against municipalities, which have a substantial stake in the outcome 
and a risk of exposure to damages liability even when individual officers are 
plainly protected by qualified immunity."82 While suits against 
municipalities undoubtedly also can clarify the law, Justice Stevens's 
response is incomplete because a suit against a municipality requires the 
additional showing of a policy or custom that engendered the alleged 
violation. 83 This requirement may be prohibitive in many instances. 
Moreover, while some constitutional claims are likely to be raised by 
defendants in criminal proceedings-where the incentive for raising the 
claim is high and an attorney is provided free of charge to the indigent-
other claims are not susceptible to such resolution. 84 In the Fourth 
Amendment context, for example, victims of excessive use of force by 
police officers are far less likely to litigate their claims due to the time and 
80. As Greabe explains: 
When a court bypasses the merits of the pleaded constitutional claim in the circumstances 
just described, it not only effectively awards the defendant officers one 'liability-free' 
violation of the Constitution (as it must under the doctrine of qualified immunity), but it 
also, by declining to 'clearly establish' the undermined right, paves the way for 'multiple 
bites of a constitutionally forbidden fruit.' 
Greabe, supra note 18, at 430 (quoting Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656-57 n.8 (lOth 
Cir. 1987) (criticizing avoidance of constitutional questions in qualified immunity context)). 
81. !d. at 429 n.l39. 
82. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998); see Rosenthal, supra note I, at 
859 n.241 (questioning whether qualified immunity doctrine "has stunted the development of 
constitutional law," given that new constitutional law also grows from suits for injunctive relief, 
suits against municipal policies, and criminal litigation). 
83. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
84. Karlan, supra note 8, at 1915-16. 
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expense associated with finding an attorney and filing suit. 85 The notion that 
the law may be clarified via mechanisms other than § 1983 suits against 
individual government defendants, therefore, is an incomplete response to 
sequencing proponents' emphasis on the need for law elaboration. 
The key to settling the sequencing debate, therefore, lies in closer 
examination-at an empirical rather than theoretical level-of the law-
clarification function of sequencing. Following Saucier's sequencing 
requirement, How did courts resolve the constitutional questions that they 
previously would have avoided? To that end, I collected data regarding the 
effect of the Court's imposition of the sequencing rationale over time, and in 
the next section, I present a quantitative analysis that supplies insight into 
this previously unanswered question and another framework for evaluating 
the Supreme Court's recent decision to overrule Saucier. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
My research attempted to measure the effect of Siegert and Saucier on 
federal courts' decisions in qualified immunity cases. Caselaw prior to 
Siegert reveals that, left to their own devices, courts would practice 
constitutional avoidance and decide many cases on qualified immunity 
grounds alone. Saucier, however, required decision of the constitutional 
question the case presents. I strove, therefore, to determine how courts 
decided those constitutional questions that they previously would have 
avoided. 
My empirical examination proceeded from the assumption that the cases 
where courts previously chose to avoid the constitutional question generally 
presented more difficult constitutional issues. In those cases, the 
constitutional question was close enough that the court opted to resolve the 
case on immunity grounds instead. Indeed, one might reasonably predict 
that these difficult decisions, balanced on a knife edge, would come out in 
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant with similar frequency. My research 
sought to determine whether empirical reality bore out this tentative 
hypothesis. 
A. Methodology 
I used the cases available on Westlaw as my data set. Within the 
database containing all federal district court cases (DCT), I generated a 
numbered list of every case containing the term "qualified immunity" for 
each of three time periods: (1) two years before Siegert; (2) two years before 
85. /d. at 1916. 
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Saucier; and (3) two recent calendar years, 2006 and 2007. I did the same 
within the database containing all federal appellate court cases (CTA). 
It was not feasible to read every case decided during each of these time 
periods, 86 so I instead examined a random sample of cases from each time 
period. To ensure that cases I read were a random sample, I used a random 
sequence generator to create a numerical sequence containing the number of 
cases in each of the three lists. 87 I then read the cases in the order dictated 
by the sequence. For example, for the two years leading up to Siegert, 
Westlaw contains 746 district court cases that contain the words "qualified 
immunity." I therefore used the random sequence generator to create a 
sequence including the integers 1 to 746. The sequence began with 305, so 
the 305th case on my Westlaw-generated list became the first case that I 
read. 88 
Not every case that I read became part of my sample. Rather, a case 
became part of the sample only if it met the following criteria: ( 1) a plaintiff 
brought at least one constitutional or federal statutory claim seeking money 
damages against an individual government-offiCial defendant; (2) the 
defendant raised a qualified immunity defense against that claim; and (3) the 
court decided the merits of either the constitutional or statutory claim, the 
86. The district court database on Westlaw contained 746 cases containing the words "qualified 
immunity" for the two years before Siegert, 1,720 cases for the two years before Saucier, and 6,680 
cases for the years 2006 and 2007. The appellate court database contained 646 cases containing the 
words "qualified immunity" for the two years before Siegert, 1,146 cases for the two years before 
Saucier, and I, 195 cases for the years 2006 and 2007. There are considerably more cases in later 
years-particularly district court cases for 2006 and 2007-because, over time, Westlaw has 
included a greater number of unpublished cases from many jurisdictions. See infra notes 122-125 
and accompanying text. 
87. The random sequence generator I used is available at Random.org, http://www.random.org/ 
sequences/ (last visited March 24, 2009). 
88. I acknowledge some imperfections in my data set. Westlaw itself is biased in a number of 
ways. It contains all published cases, but only some unpublished cases. The percentage of 
unpublished cases it contains varies from one jurisdiction to the next. This percentage also has 
changed over time. Relatedly, different jurisdictions vary dramatically in the percentage of 
decisions they publish. In short, discrepancies between published and unpublished cases might, in 
many instances, taint Westlaw-based empirical work. I found, however, that for my purposes, no 
material difference existed in the results for published and unpublished cases. See infra text 
accompanying notes 119-125. As an alternative to Westlaw, I considered looking at all cases-both 
published and unpublished-from selected jurisdictions, but concluded that this tactic would risk 
introducing idiosyncrasies associated with certain jurisdictions. Despite Westlaw's imperfections, 
therefore, I concluded that it was best suited to my purposes. Finally, other empirical research 
indicates that Westlaw and Lexis contain a very similar set of cases, so my decision to use Westlaw 
rather than Lexis was unlikely to influence the result. See Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The 
Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REv. 107, 134 
(2007) (reporting that only 6% of cases in relevant data set appeared in one database but not the 
other). 
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qualified immunity claim, or both. A case on the Westlaw-generated list 
might fail to meet these criteria for any number of reasons. The case might 
have been resolved on other grounds-for example, the court might have 
held that the case was brought outside the statute of limitations, the case was 
moot, or the plaintiff lacked standing. Or the case might mention qualified 
immunity (in a parenthetical describing another case, for example) even if it 
did not actually involve the assertion of a qualified immunity defense. For 
each of the six Westlaw-generated lists, between a quarter and a third of the 
cases on the list did not meet the three criteria set forth above. If a case did 
not meet my criteria, I did not include it in my data set. I continued reading 
cases until I had a set of 100 district court and 100 appellate cases that met 
my criteria from each of the three time periods. 
Unsurprisingly, some of the 100 cases involved more than one claimed 
constitutional or statutory89 violation against which qualified immunity was 
raised. 9° For each time period, therefore, I created a spreadsheet in which I 
listed separately each claim adjudicated in each of the 100 cases. 91 
Some cases also involved the same claim brought against multiple 
defendants. I listed the claims against multiple defendants separately only 
where the court reached different results for different defendants. For 
example, if a prisoner brought a § 1983 suit against twelve prison officials, 
claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, 
and the court held that none of the twelve had committed a constitutional 
violation, the suit counted once. If, however, the court held that one of the 
twelve officers had violated the Constitution and was not entitled to 
qualified immunity, I would list that claim twice on my spreadsheet. In 
other words, a different result led to a separate listing. 92 
89. As it turned out, most of the claims against which defendants asserted qualified immunity 
were constitutional claims. Throughout the paper, I will refer to the elements of the sequencing 
inquiry as "the constitutional issue" and "the qualified immunity issue." The former, however, 
should always be understood to refer to "the constitutional or statutory issue." 
90. If a defendant raised qualified immunity against some claims but not others within a single 
case, I did not include the claims against which the qualified immunity defense was not raised in my 
data set. 
91. These spreadsheets are available at Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-saucier-qual 
ified-immunity-experiment-an-empirical-analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-667 _24/ (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2009). 
92. This method of counting separate defendants only when they generated different results is 
admittedly imperfect. However, I chose it because it is better than any alternative. Counting each 
claim against each defendant separately would give undue weight to cases in which the plaintiff 
(perhaps gratuitously) sued many defendants. The only other alternative-fractional division-
would, I believe, undervalue the significance of the courts allowing a claim to proceed against even 
one defendant out of many, because even that holding generates new plaintiff-friendly case law. At 
a minimum, my method allows a comparison among results from different time periods because the 
methodology is consistent throughout. 
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Ultimately, each set of 100 cases generated between 142 and 195 
separate claims. 93 I then placed each resulting claim in one of six 
categories: 94 
(1) The court recognized a constitutional violation but granted qualified 
immunity. 
(2) The court recognized a violation, then denied immunity. This 
included cases decided on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment where the court took the facts 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thus, to fall in this category, the 
court did not need to enter judgment in the plaintifrs favor. Rather, the 
court merely needed to hold that the plaintiff could make out a case that her 
rights had been violated and that the defendant was not entitled to qualified 
immunity, given whatever view of the facts was appropriate at that particular 
stage of the proceedings. 
(3) The court held that no violation had occurred and did not address 
the immunity question. 
(4) The court held that no violation had occurred and went on to hold 
that, in any event, the defendant was entitled to immunity. 
(5) The court granted immunity without addressing whether a 
constitutional violation had occurred-in other words, it avoided the 
constitutional question. 
(6) The court did none of the above. Usually this meant that the court 
deviated substantially from prevailing Supreme Court guidelines regarding 
the resolution of qualified immunity cases. For example, this residual 
category includes cases where the court found (at least for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) that a constitutional 
violation had occurred, yet failed to address whether the defendant was 
entitled to qualified immunity (despite the defendant having raised the 
defense). 95 It also includes cases where the court (oddly) held that the 
defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity-because the relevant law 
93. The district court cases yielded 163 claims in the pre-Siegert time period, 165 claims in the 
pre-Saucier time period, and 195 claims in the 2006-2007 time period. The appellate court cases 
yielded 142 claims in the pre-Siegert time period, 144 claims in the pre-Saucier time period, and 155 
claims in the 2006-2007 time period. 
94. The six categories enumerated here correspond to the number under the "Type" column on 
my spreadsheets. See Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-saucier-qualified-immunity-
experiment-an-empirical-analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-667_24/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). 
95. See, e.g., Ernst v. Borough of fort Lee, 739 F. Supp. 220 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding strip search 
violated Constitution but failing to address officers' asserted immunity defense). 
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was clearly established-but that, in fact, no constitutional violation had 
occurred. 96 
Although this categorization was my primary focus, I also collected a 
variety of additional information to allow for the possibility of identifying 
other trends, including the constitutional or statutory basis for the claim 
asserted by the plaintiff, the procedural posture of the case, any subsequent 
procedural history, which judge decided the case, and the party of the 
president who appointed that judge. 97 
Finally, to test the reliability of my own categorization decisions, I 
recoded my results by having an independent auditor read and categorize 
twenty-five cases from each of my six samples. The rate of agreement was 
92%, leading to a conclusion that my results were highly reliable. 
B. Summary of Findings 
Unsurprisingly, as the Supreme Court moved toward mandatory 
sequencing, the percentage of cases in which courts avoided the 
constitutional question decreased significantly.98 Figure 1 summarizes the 
results for the district court cases for each of the three time periods for the 
claims in which the court found for the defendant. 99 The percentage of 
claims where the court avoided the constitutional question decreased from 
28.6% [21.2, 36.0] pre-Siegert to 6.4% [2.5, 10.3] in 2006-2007. 
Intriguingly, that decrease corresponded to an increase only in the 
percentage of claims in which courts found no violation. Thus, the 
percentage of claims where the court found a violation but then granted 
96. See, e.g., DiLegge v. Gleason, 131 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that qualified 
immunity was unavailable because the law was clearly established, yet concluding that no 
constitutional or statutory violation had taken place). 
97. In addition, for the district court cases I also noted whether the plaintiff was pro se and 
whether a magistrate judge was involved. For the appellate court cases I also noted how the district 
court had decided the case and whether the appellate court affirmed or reversed that decision. I did 
not, however, end up incorporating that data into this paper. 
98. Throughout this section, I employ the notation X% [Y, Z] to denote the actual percentage my 
sample yielded, followed by the upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence interval 
associated wit}) the result. Thus, when I say that district courts in the pre-Siegert time period 
avoided the constitutional question in 28.6% (21.2, 36.0] of cases, I mean to convey that my best 
estimate is 28.6%, but that the actual number could be as low as 21.2% or as high as 36.0%. I expect 
that the percentages I found and the uncertainty relating to those percentages will provide sufficient 
information for the vast majority of readers. For the statistically inclined, I have also posted a 
document on my website detailing the statistical analysis I performed using the data I gathered. See 
Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-saucier-qualified-immunity-experiment-an-empirical-
analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-667 _24/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2009). Throughout this section, I 
have attempted to conform the presentation of my data to the helpful standards elucidated by Lee 
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the 
Results of Empirical Studies, 59 V AND. L. REv. 1811 (2006). 
99. I have included the precise numerical data from which I created Figures I through 6 in the 
Appendix. 
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immunity actually decreased slightly, from 5.7% [1.8, 9.6] pre-Siegert to 
4.5% [2.5, 10.3] in 2006--2007. But the percentage of claims for which the 
court found no constitutional right existed increased dramatically, from 
65.7% [58.1, 73.3] pre-Siegert to 89.1% in 2006--2007 [84.2, 94.0]. 100 
Figure 1: District court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed 
100 ------····---·-···-------------------
6~+---------------------~ 
40% +-------------------------1 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
--+ Avoided constitutional 
question; granted immunity 
--- Held constitutional violation; 
granted immunity 
..,....Held no constitutional 
violation 
As depicted in Figure 2, the trend was similar among appellate courts. 
The percentage of claims where the court avoided the constitutional question 
decreased substantially, from 48.1% [40.1, 56.1] pre-Siegert to only 6.2% 
[2.1, 10.3] in 2006--2007. The percentage of claims in which courts found a 
constitutional violation but then granted qualified immunity was 5.7% [2.0, 
9.4] pre-Siegert and 8.8% [3.9, 13.7] in 2006--2007-thus, the difference 
I 00. These percentages aggregate the percentage of cases where the court simply found no 
violation and those in which the court found no violation and went on to grant immunity (perhaps as 
a means of protecting the ultimate outcome against appellate reversal). This aggregate percentage is 
most useful in considering the overall trends because it reflects the total percentage of cases in which 
courts did not recognize a violation. For the sake of revealing the trends within the subcategories, 
however, I will include the subcategory breakdown in parentheses following the overall percentage 
in the charts contained in the Appendix. The first number represents the percentage of claims where 
the court simply found no constitutional violation had occurred. The second number represents the 
percentage where the court went on to state that in any event the defendant was entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
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was not statistically significant. But the percentage of claims where the 
court found no constitutional right existed increased dramatically, from 
46.2% [39.3, 53.1] pre-Siegert to 84.9% [78.8, 91.0] in 2006-2007. 
Figure 2: Appellate court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed 
100'/o -------------------------
--+ A voided constitutional 
question; granted immunity 
; -Held constitutional 
violation; granted immunity 
40% +---------.......,-------------------'' .....,..Held no constitutional 
violation 
0%~::======~~==~~~===-~_:~ 
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The data for both district and appellate court cases show, therefore, that 
the expected significant decrease in the percentage of cases where courts 
avoided the constitutional question was accompanied by virtually no change 
in the percentage of cases where courts held that a constitutional violation 
had taken place and a striking increase in the percentage of cases where 
courts held that no constitutional violation had taken place. 
The trend remains consistent when claims where the court ultimately 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff are included in the calculations. 101 Figure 3 
summarizes that data at the district court level: the decline in avoidance 
(from 18.6% [13.3, 23.9] pre-Siegert to 5.1% [2.0, 8.2] in 2006-2007) is 
accompanied by no change in the likelihood of a court finding a 
constitutional violation but granting qualified immunity (level at about 4%) 
and a marked increase in the likelihood of the court finding no constitutional 
violation (from 42.2% [35.7, 48.7] pre-Siegert to 61.4% [54.7, 68.1] in 
10 I. We would not automatically expect the trend to persist when cases where the court denied 
qualified immunity are included. For example, Saucier might have induced courts that would 
previously have avoided the constitutional issue to consider the constitutional issue first, reach the 
conclusion that a violation occurred, and thus be disinclined to grant qualified immunity to the 
defendant officer. Such a trend would result in expansion of constitutional rights, thereby 
contradicting the trend seen in Figures I and 2. 
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2006-2007). Similarly, Figure 4 summarizes the data at the appellate level: 
the decline in avoidance (from 35.4% [28. 7, 42.1] pre-Siegert to 4.5% [1.4, 
7.6] in 2006-2007) is accompanied by a statistically insignificant change in 
the likelihood of a court finding a constitutional violation but granting 
qualified immunity (from 4.2% [1.5, 6.9] pre-Siegert to 6.5% [3.0, 10.0] in 
2006-2007) and a marked increase in the likelihood of the court finding no 
constitutional violation (from 34.0% [27.5, 40.5] pre-Siegert to 61.9% [54.8, 
69.0] in 2006-2007). 
I note that among district court cases, the percentage of claims where the 
court found a constitutional violation and denied qualified immunity 
decreased significantly, from 32.3% [26.0, 38.6] prior to Siegert to 14.4% 
[9.5, 19.3] in 2006-2007. A decrease in the same category, however, was 
not present at the appellate level, where virtually no change occurred. 102 
Perhaps the decline at the district court level is explicable by a trend among 
plaintiffs to bring more claims per lawsuit. 103 But in any event, the decline 
in rulings for plaintiffs at the district court level does not explain the overall 
increase in the articulation of law favoring defendants. 
102. In the pre-Siegert time frame, the coUrt found a violation in 25.0% [19.1, 30.9] of cases, and 
in 2006-2007, the court found a constitutional violation in 26.5% [20.2, 32.8] of cases. 
I 03. Within the district court sample, plaintiffs brought a greater average number of claims per 
case in 2006-2007 than in the pre-Siegert time period: the 100-case sample for the 2006-2007 time 
period yielded 195 claims, while the pre-Siegert sample yielded only 161 claims. 
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Figure 3: AU district court claims 
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In the aggregate, these data indicate that the Supreme Court's move 
toward mandatory sequencing has had a lopsided influence on the 
articulation of new constitutional law. Courts now avoid fewer 
constitutional questions, and as a result, generate more constitutional law. 
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But the new constitutional law-law that would not have been made before 
Siegert and Saucier-uniformly denies the existence of plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights. 
I express no opinion on whether sequencing actually creates an incentive 
for judges to find against plaintiffs. The data I have collected neither 
support nor contradict that conclusion because they offer no insight into how 
the courts would have decided the cases they avoided pre-Saucier. Rather, 
my research simply reveals an unexpected phenomenon: that the 
constitutional questions avoided pre-Saucier are now almost uniformly 
decided in defendants' favor. The possibility that sequencing not only 
causes the articulation of, but actually incentivizes, denial of constitutional 
violations is an intriguing one that perhaps future scholarship will explore. 
Finally, I wish to address the other empirical work in this area. 
Professor Healy's work exammmg courts' willingness to expand 
constitutional rights in the two years following Saucier is-as far as it 
goes--consistent with my results. 104 Although Healy's methodology 
differed from mine in several respects, 105 making direct comparison 
impossible, he found that courts were far more likely to deny than to 
acknowledge new constitutional rights: In 76% of the cases where an 
appellate court ultimately granted qualified immunity for the defendants, the 
court also held that the asserted constitutional right did not exist, while in 
only 17% of cases did the court acknowledge the existence of the right. 106 
At a basic level, therefore, our results similarly demonstrate that courts are 
more likely to deny than to acknowledge constitutional rights. 
104. See Healy, supra note 10, at 930-31, app. 
105. I do not wish to criticize Professor Healy's research, which suffices for the purposes of his 
eloquent and persuasive article; I merely wish to explain why his results are not suitable for direct 
comparison to my own. The differences in methodology are substantial. Healy generated his initial 
list from a Westlaw headnote stating Saucier's sequencing requirement. Because many cases might 
have cited other precedent for the sequencing requirement (such as the leading case within the 
circuit), his list is almost certainly underinclusive. Healy acknowledges this possibility but declares 
his methodology sufficient to capture, broadly, the fact that courts are more likely to deny than to 
acknowledge constitutional rights when they plan to grant qualified immunity. /d. at 937 n.431. 
Healy's failure to compare the post-Saucier time frame with a pre-Saucier reference point also limits 
the probative value of his data: he cannot claim that sequencing led to increased denial of 
constitutional rights when he lacks data regarding the rate of such denials pre-Saucier. Healy also 
does not examine cases in which courts found a constitutional right and denied qualified immunity, 
which overlooks the possibility that Saucier affected such cases as well. For a discussion of this 
possibility, see supra note I 00. Finally, Healy makes no attempt to account for situations in which 
courts reached different results for different defendants. 
106. In the other 7% of cases, Healy found that courts departed from Saucier's sequencing 
requirement. Healy, supra note 10, at 930 n.423 
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Paul Hughes has also published empirical research categonzmg all 
circuit court cases involving a qualified immunity defense decided in 1988, 
1995, and 2005. 107 His careful and thorough research reveals-
unsurprisingly in light of Siegert and Saucier-that the appellate courts 
followed the Supreme Court's directive with respect to the resolution of the 
constitutional issue before the qualified immunity issue: constitutional law 
articulation rose from 65% to 74% to 99%, respectively, during the three 
time periods examined. 108 Hughes does not, however, attempt to examine 
the nature or quality of the newly articulated law. His paper, therefore, 
chiefly demonstrates that the appellate courts largely tend to follow the 
procedural framework laid out by the Supreme Court. As such, his work is 
fully consistent with both Professor Healy's and my own. 
C. Eliminating Other Explanations 
Before further exploring the trends in my data, I wish to rule out several 
alternate explanations for the results obtained. I considered possible 
extrajudicial explanations for the data, as well as some problems with the 
data set itself. 
Overall composition of courts' dockets. One factor that could call my 
results into question is variation in the overall number and composition of 
civil rights cases filed. Figure 5 presents data on this issue compiled by the 
federal government. 109 Broadly speaking, the total number of non-prisoner-
I 07. Paul Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of 
Constitutional Rights, 80 COLO. L. REv. 401 (2009). 
108. ld. 
109. I used data compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics and the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to complete this Figure. I drew the number of civil rights 
cases from 1990 to 2000 for cases not involving prisoners from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CIVIL JUSTICE DATA BRIEF: CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000 (2002), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/crcusOO.pdf. For 2001 through 2005, I drew the 
numbers from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 161 tbl. C-2A (2006), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/c2a.pdf [hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]. And 
for 2006 and 2007, I drew the numbers from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 145 tbl. C-2 
(2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02Sep07 .pdf [hereinafter 
2007 ANNUAL REPORT]. For 2001 and later, therefore, the data actually include the twelve months 
preceding September 30 of that year-i.e., the data reported for 2001 include cases between October 
I, 2000, and September 30, 200 I; the data reported for 2002 included cases between October I, 
200 I, and September 30, 2002; and so forth. I obtained data regarding prisoner-filed civil rights 
cases from 1990 to 2000 by aggregating the claims filed by federal and state inmates reported in 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000, at 2 tbl. I (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusdOO.pdf. For 2001 through 2007, I drew data from 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, 
and 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra. To obtain the total number of cases for these years, I added 
prisoner civil rights and prison conditions suits together because the civil rights category from the 
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initiated civil rights cases increased steadily until 1997, then declined until 
the present. Meanwhile, the number of prisoner-initiated suits increased 
significantly until 1996, when it declined dramatically-probably due to the 
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, with its requirement of 
administrative exhaustion 110-and has remained fairly stable since 2001. In 
the aggregate, therefore, the number of civil rights cases commenced in the 
federal district courts peaked in 1996 at 83,222, well before Saucier was 
decided in 2001, and subsequently declined, steadily, to only 55,781 such 
cases in 2007. 
These trends in the number of cases filed do not have any inherent 
implication for my data. Even if the raw number of cases changed, the 
percent of such cases that were decided in a particular way would not 
necessarily change. Some commentators have speculated, however, that the 
increase in suits filed during the 1990s was attributable to an increase in the 
proportion of frivolous or non-meritorious suits, particularly those suits 
involving prisoners. 111 
1980-2000 report included prison conditions suits. Finally, I added the non-prisoner-initiated and 
prisoner-initiated numbers together to obtain the total number of civil rights claims. 
110. See Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (codification of exhaustion requirement). 
Ill. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1594 (2003) 
(explaining that 82% of inmate litigation from 1980 to 1995 resulted in judgment for the defendants, 
and that inmate litigation comprised fifteen percent of the federal docket in 1995). 
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Figure 5: Civil Rights Cases Commenced In District Court 1990-2007 
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For the sake of argument, I will assume that more suits overall equates 
to more frivolous suits. And an increase in the number of frivolous suits 
might be linked to an increase in the percentage of claims in which the court 
found that no constitutional violation occurred. 
But even if this assumption is in fact true-a proposition on which I 
express no opinion-it has not skewed the data for present purposes. Most 
obviously, the increase in the overall number of suits, with its hypothesized 
corresponding increase in the number of non-meritorious suits, peaked in 
1996 and declined thereafter. But my data show a steady increase in the 
number of constitutional rulings against plaintiffs during this period of 
decline, from 46% during the pre-Saucier period in 1999-2001 to 71% in 
2006-2007. If anything, therefore, the decline in rulings favorable to 
plaintiffs has occurred despite this hypothesized decrease in the number of 
non-meritorious suits. 
More concretely, I base my conclusion that the overall composition of 
civil rights cases on the federal docket has not skewed my results on the 
similarity of the trends seen at the district court and appellate levels. Even if 
a greater percentage of claims filed before the district court in recent years 
are-for whatever reason-lacking in merit, such cases are unlikely to reach 
the appellate level. First, such cases are less likely to be appealed. 
Moreover, structures present at the appellate level mitigate the possibility 
that a greater number of non-meritorious cases filed at the district court level 
696 
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
will affect the appellate docket. Each circuit has a screening procedure 
involving a team of staff attorneys to deal more expeditiously with non-
meritorious cases. 112 Although commentators have analyzed and critiqued 
this screening process, 113 the important point, for my purposes here, is that 
non-meritorious cases are likely to be weeded out before hearing by an 
appellate panel and disposed of by summary disposition. 114 Given this 
vetting process, it is improbable that the decline in rulings favorable to 
plaintiffs revealed by my data is the byproduct of a greater percentage of 
appellate courts' written decisions ruling on non-meritorious cases. 
Political views of judges. One might also argue that courts' apparent 
reluctance to avail themselves of the option of finding a violation but 
granting immunity could stem from the much-discussed conservative trend 
in the judiciary. 115 Ideally, one would test this possibility by attempting to 
compare the results reached by conservative and liberal district court 
judges. 116 But because (obviously) there is no database listing judges as 
"liberal" or "conservative," the best available proxy for the political 
ideology of a judge is the party of the president who appointed the judge. 
112. U.S. Courts, Newsroom, Staff Attorney Offices Help Manage Rising Caseloads (Feb. 17, 
2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/stffattys.htm ("Core responsibilities vary among staff 
attorney offices, but in each appeals court they include review of all appeals filed by prison inmates 
without a lawyer's help. Screening such 'prose' prisoner cases was the initial focus of staff attorney 
offices when they were formally authorized and established by Congress in 1982."). The magnitude 
of the staff attorneys' screening role is also acknowledged by judges. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The 
Appearance of Propriety, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 19 (explaining that a team of seventy staff 
attorneys processes about 40% of the cases in which the Ninth Circuit issues a merits ruling). 
113. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff 
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. STATE L.J. I (2007). 
114. None of the cases I examined on Westlaw fell into this category. 
115. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of George W. Bush's Judges: How 
Sharp a Turn to the Right?, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLITICS: CLASSIC AND 
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 429, 438-41 (Samuel Kernell & Steven S. Smith eds., 3d ed. 2007) 
(discussing evidence that federal judges appointed by George W. Bush are the most conservative in 
modern history with respect to civil rights and liberties). Commentators debate the recency of this 
conservative trend. See, e.g., STEVEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH? 28 (2002) (contending that the lower federal courts are a battleground between more 
liberal Carter and Clinton appointees and more conservative judges appointed by Ronald Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush); William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political 
Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 525, 530 (2005) (highlighting the Reagan Justice Department's efforts 
to appoint conservative judges to the bench). I do not attempt to weigh in on this debate; rather, I 
only wish to rule out the impact of political affiliation on the data I have accumulated. 
116. I did not attempt to examine the effects of political affiliation on the results reached by three-
judge appellate panels. Such an inquiry would have entailed weighing the party of the president who 
appointed all three judges, and measuring the multiplicity of factors affecting the personal interplay 
between the judges would require its own theoretical modeling-a complex project beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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Using the Federal Judicial Center biographical database, I identified the 
president who had appointed each judge who decided a case in my set. 117 I 
then performed logistic regression to determine whether the trends I 
identified remained when the political party of the appointing president was 
taken into account. 118 
The analysis demonstrated that the party of the appointing president did 
not account for the trends I identified. When political affiliation was taken 
into account, there was no statistically significant change in the percentage 
of cases in which courts held that there was a constitutional violation but 
granted qualified immunity. There was a statistically significant increase in 
the percentage of cases in which courts denied that a constitutional violation 
had occurred. And there was a corresponding statistically significant 
decrease in the percentage of cases where courts avoided the constitutional 
question. 
For readers less versed in statistics, Figure 6 offers a visual 
demonstration of the minimal impact of political affiliation. The visible 
similarity in the bar graphs for Democratic and Republican appointees for 
each time period helps to illustrate that the two groups decided cases in a 
quite similar fashion during all three time periods. 
117. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
home.nsf/hisj (last visited March 24, 2009). A few cases were decided by magistrate judges, who 
are not politically appointed. These cases were not included in the statistical analysis. 
118. Regression analysis was appropriate because time functioned as a continuous independent 
variable in the analysis. Logistic regression, rather than standard regression, was necessary because 
the values in question were percentages. I used the statistical software R to perform the logistic 
regression. The full results of that analysis are available at Nancy Leong, http://nancyleong.com/the-
saucier-qualified-immunity-experiment-an-empirical-analysis-36-pepperdine-law-review-667 _24/ 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2009). 
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The results demonstrate that members of both parties were uniformly 
reluctant to hold that a violation had taken place, yet grant immunity. There 
were more claims decided by Republican appointees in the pre-Siegert and 
2006-2007 time frames (72 to 33 and 78 to 62, respectively), but more 
claims decided by Democratic appointees in the pre-Saucier time frame ( 65 
to 36). The shifting majority is unsurprising given that the pre-Saucier time 
699 
frame fell near the end of a Democratic presidential administration, while 
the other time frames followed Republican administrations. But the fact that 
the identified trends persisted despite the change in the political makeup of 
the judiciary indicates that political appointment had little to do with those 
trends. Moreover, there were several instances of judicial behavior that were 
ideologically counterintuitive. Stereotypically, Republican appointees are 
more reluctant to acknowledge constitutional rights for plaintiffs, yet 
Republican appointees were actually more likely than their Democratic 
counterparts to find a constitutional violation yet grant immunity in the pre-
Siegert and pre-Saucier time periods (although the disparity was not 
statistically significant). In short, the alleged conservative trend in the 
judiciary does not appear to have had an impact on the consequences of 
mandatory sequencing. 
Westlaw and publication practices. Aside from the external factors 
discussed above, I wish to discuss a few potential issues with the data set 
itself. These issues result from the arbitrary manner in which cases are 
selected for publication and the way Westlaw selects cases for inclusion. 
According to the most recent available data, federal district court judges 
decide to publish only one or two out of every ten opinions, 119 and appellate 
courts also publish less than 20% of their opinions. 120 The movement 
toward limited publication began in 1964, when the Judicial Conference of 
the United States noted that the increasing number of published opinions 
burdened the resources of law libraries. 121 According to the 1973 Advisory 
Council for Appellate Justice Report formal guidelines, which govern both 
federal district and appellate courts: 
An opinion should be published if it does any one of the following: 
(1) "lays down a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing 
rule"; (2) "involves a legal issue of continuing public interest," 
rather than "general public interest of a fleeting nature"; (3) 
"criticizes existing law," especially calling for change by a higher 
court or legislature; or (4) resolves a conflict of authority and 
"rationalizes apparent divergences in the way an existing rule has 
been applied." 122 
119. See, e.g., Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 
JUST. SYS. J. 121 (2004); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look 
at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004). 
120. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl. 2.5, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicia1factsfigures/2006/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf (noting 
that only 18.4% of cases were published in 2005). 
121. Swenson, supra note 119, at 121. 
122. !d. 
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Different jurisdictions, however, have markedly different practices with 
respect to publication, publishing anywhere from 10% to slightly over half 
of their decisions. 123 The first complication, therefore, arises because 
Westlaw ties inclusion in its database to publication: it includes all published 
opinions and only some unpublished ones. Consequently, the fact that some 
jurisdictions publish at higher rates than others may lead to 
overrepresentation of those jurisdictions in the database. 
An additional complexity arises as a result of Westlaw's inclusion 
practices with respect to unpublished opinions. For some jurisdictions, 
Westlaw includes all unpublished opinions; for others, only a percentage of 
those opinions. 124 The process by which W estlaw determines which 
opinions to include is opaque and, apparently, somewhat arbitrary. 125 The 
different rates of inclusion for different jurisdictions thus create another 
potential opportunity for the data set to become skewed. 
Though these complications limit the use of W estlaw for some purposes, 
further analysis of my data shows that any such limitation does not affect my 
results. Similar to the analysis for political affiliation, I divided the claims 
within each time period into "published" and "unpublished" categories and 
performed logistic regression. The analysis demonstrated that changes in the 
percentage of published cases did not account for the trends I identified. 
When publication was taken into account, all the identified trends remained 
present: There was no statistically significant change in the percentage of 
cases in which courts held that there was a constitutional violation but 
granted qualified immunity. There was a statistically significant increase in 
the percentage of cases in which courts denied that a constitutional violation 
had occurred. And there was a corresponding statistically significant 
decrease in the percentage of cases in which courts avoided the 
constitutional question. 
Combined factors. Finally, I used logistic regression to determine 
whether political ideology and publication together would account for the 
123. Wasby, supra note 119, at 69. 
124. For example, the database of federal district court cases on Westlaw includes all published 
opinions as well as unpublished cases for the following jurisdictions: Northern District of Illinois 
(since April 1985); Eastern District of Louisiana (since September 1986); District of Massachusetts 
(since September 1986); Eastern District of New York (since September 1986); Southern District of 
New York (since May 1984); Eastern District of Pennsylvania (since September 1985); District of 
Kansas (since November 1988); District of the District of Columbia (since July 1990); Northern 
District of California (since March 1993); Northern District of Mississippi (since June 1996); and 
Northern District ofTexas (since January 1997). 
125. Interview with Robert Blackstone, Westlaw representative (Jan. 15, 2008) (notes on file with 
author). 
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trend I observed. Once again, even when both political ideology and 
publication were taken into account, the trends I identified persisted: no 
statistically significant change in the percentage of cases in which courts 
held there was a constitutional violation, a statistically significant increase in 
the percentage of cases in which courts denied that a constitutional violation 
had occurred, and a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of 
cases in which courts engaged in avoidance. 
Thus, having considered an array of potential problems, I conclude that 
none of the variables I have discussed accounts for the trend I have 
identified. The lack of plausible alternative explanations therefore supports 
the conclusion that, in the qualified immunity context, some feature of the 
sequencing approach itself accounts for the simultaneous decrease in 
avoidance and increase in the denial of constitutional rights. In the next 
section, I will offer a few thoughts about why sequencing accounts for this 
decidedly one-sided trend. 
V. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Sequencing has altered the course of the constitutional river. Judges are 
deciding cases in a way that they would not have done but for Saucier. 
Rather than avoid the constitutional question and grant qualified immunity 
based on lack of clearly established law, courts are now articulating new 
constitutional law. But these new statements of law are not those we might 
have predicted. The original rationale for sequencing was to allow injured 
plaintiffs to recover-as Justice Scalia explained, the purpose "is to clarify 
the law and thus make unavailable repeated claims of qualified immunity in 
future cases." 126 But no increase in recovery by injured plaintiffs has 
occurred. Rather, the data suggest that the new constitutional principles that 
would not have been articulated but for the sequencing requirement 
overwhelmingly favor government defendants. 
This lopsided result invites speculation about the complexities of 
judicial behavior. I will therefore offer a few thoughts, bolstered by relevant 
research from the field of cognitive psychology, in the hope that future 
scholarship will further illuminate the shadowy realms of judges' decision 
making processes in this area. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance, described as "one of the most 
influential theories in social psychology," 127 provides a compelling 
explanation for judges' demonstrated reluctance to acknowledge a 
126. Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1024 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
127. Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance Theory and 
an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A 
PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills, eds., 1999). 
702 
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
constitutional violation but grant qualified immunity. Cognitive dissonance 
is the feeling of discomfort that results from holding two contradictory or 
inconsistent ideas simultaneously, which produces a drive to reduce the 
dissonance by modifying or rejecting one of the inconsistent ideas. 128 Leon 
Festinger, the pioneer of cognitive dissonance theory, offers the example of 
an individual who continues to smoke, knowing that it is bad for his 
health. 129 That individual may reconcile this inconsistency by deciding: 
(a) he enjoys smoking so much it is worth it; (b) the chances of his 
health suffering are not as serious as some would make out; (c) he 
can't always avoid every possible dangerous contingency and still 
live; and (d) perhaps even if he stopped smoking he would put on 
weight which is equally bad for his health. 130 
The existence of a dissonant state, therefore, leads individuals to seek or 
accept information that reduces dissonance, while discounting evidence that 
increases dissonance by ignoring, discrediting, or denying it. 131 
Subsequent studies about the factors that influence dissonance suggest 
that judges are likely to experience dissonance more acutely than members 
of the general population. 132 Judges, in other words, have unique and 
powerful incentives to avoid dissonance wherever possible. Research 
indicates that the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance is particularly strong 
when individuals are publicly and irrevocably committed to a position they 
have adopted. 133 This research undoubtedly applies to judges, whose written 
opinions are enshrined for all to read in print reporters and online databases. 
Likewise, the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance inheres in a decision only 
when that decision is made freely. 134 Research has found, for example, that 
128. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITlVE DISSONANCE 128-29 (1957). 
129. !d. at 2. 
130. !d. 
131. See id. at 3 ("When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will 
actively avoid situations and infonnation which would likely increase the dissonance."). 
132. While a comprehensive survey of cognitive dissonance research is unnecessary for the 
general conclusions presented in this paper, two useful resources that offer up-to-date overviews of 
the field are COGNITlVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 
supra note 127, and JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY 
(2007). 
133. See, e.g., J. Merrill Carlsmith et al., Studies in Forced Compliance, 4 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. I (1966); Keith E. Davis & Edward E. Jones, Changes in Interpersonal Perception as a 
Means of Reducing Cognitive Dissonance, 61 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 402 (1960). 
134. See, e.g., Darwyn E. Linder et al., Decision Freedom as a Determinant of the Role of 
Incentive Magnitude in Attitude Change, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245 (1967). 
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students who chose to participate in an experiment experienced a great deal 
more dissonance (and correspondingly changed their attitudes to reduce that 
dissonance) when asked to write essays that conflicted with their beliefs than 
those who were required to participate in the same experiment. 135 It is likely 
that those who participated voluntarily felt more responsible for their own 
behavior. As Professor Cooper emphasizes, "[c]hoice matters," 136 and 
judges, with their lifetime tenure and broad discretion, exercise virtually 
unfettered choice. This freedom to choose the outcome of a case, and the 
responsibility that accompanies such a choice, initiates a powerful 
compulsion to reduce dissonance resulting from that choice. 
Cognitive dissonance theory offers a compelling explanation for the 
lopsidedness of constitutional law articulation after Saucier. 137 As we have 
seen, even before Siegert, judges were reluctant to acknowledge a violation 
but deny recovery on immunity grounds. From the perspective of 
dissonance theory, such reluctance is expected. Our legal culture is steeped 
in the principle that "where there is a right, there must be a remedy." 138 The 
act of recognizing a right, yet precluding a remedy, could create cognitive 
dissonance for many judges, whose education, training, and even moral 
inclination encourage them to ensure that rights and remedies remain linked. 
Such dissonance is only compounded by the fact that it is a constitutional 
right that would be recognized, and a judge-made mechanism that would 
preclude entitlement to a remedy. Acknowledging a constitutional injury 
while precluding recovery may therefore create intense internal discomfort 
for judges. Rather than tolerate this cognitive dissonance, judges may be 
subconsciously inclined to deny that a constitutional violation occurred at 
all. 
Other jurisprudential conventions also induce judges to avoid cognitive 
dissonance by denying the existence of constitutional rights. The notion of 
reliance on precedent is deeply ingrained in-indeed, integral to-our 
common law legal system. But granting immunity to a defendant officer 
tends to undermine the plausibility of holding that a constitutional violation 
occurred. The act of acknowledging that no court has previously held that a 
constitutional violation exists under the circumstances entails 
135. !d. 
136. COOPER, supra note 132, at 63. 
137. Festinger seems almost to have directly contemplated judicial decision making, explaining 
that "[w]here an opinion must be formed or a decision taken, some dissonance is almost unavoidably 
created." FESTINGER, supra note 128, at 5. 
138. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 162--63 (1803) (citing WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES •23, •!09); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, 
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1778 & n.243 (1991) 
(summarizing the establishment of the principle that, where there is a law, there is a remedy and 
explaining that this principle is a cornerstone of the American legal tradition). 
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acknowledging the lack of precedent for what the court is about to do. 139 
The inherent reasonableness of a decision is also a well-recognized precept, 
one not casually ignored. For a defendant officer to be held liable, "the 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 140 By 
recognizing a constitutional violation but granting qualified immunity, a 
court must concede (at least implicitly) that it is reaching a result that a 
reasonable officer would not have predicted. 141 The judiciary has recently 
faced accusations of so-called judicial activism, and in light of these charges, 
judges may be especially wary of reaching a result that appears to go out on 
a limb or create new law. 142 
In the few cases where judges have recognized a constitutional right 
while granting qualified immunity to the officers who violated that right, the 
decision was often justified by some additional factor, such as novel factual 
circumstances or previously-unaddressed technology. The Supreme Court, 
for instance, has found a constitutional violation, yet granted immunity, on 
only one occasion. In Wilson v. Layne, the Court held that officers who 
entered a private residence to execute an arrest warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they brought a newspaper reporter and a photographer 
with them. 143 But concluding that the constitutional question "is by no 
means open and shut," the Court then granted immunity to the police 
officers. 144 Wilson is notable for the novelty of its factual circumstances. 
Indeed, the Court identified only one published state intermediate court 
139. The Supreme Court has held that "clearly establish[ing]" legal principles sufficient to 
preclude qualified immunity requires on-point caselaw from the Supreme Court, controlling 
authority in the relevant jurisdiction, or a "consensus of cases of persuasive authority." Wilson v. 
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). A court might therefore be able to buttress its argument using 
persuasive authority that fell short of a consensus or non-persuasive authority such as district court 
opinions. The use of such authority, however, might also signal the lack of stronger authority, 
thereby highlighting, rather than downplaying, the uniqueness of the court's result. 
140. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,640 (1987). 
141. See Amanda K. Eaton, Note, Opticalll/usions: The Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established 
Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REv. 661, 
696-702 (2004) (advocating increased emphasis on the reasonableness of the officer's actions in 
determining qualified immunity). 
142. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. 
REv. 1441, 1442 (2004) (noting that the term has been discussed in over five thousand law review 
articles); id. at 1443 n.8 ("In the past decade (from 1994 to August 2004), 'judicial activism' and its 
cognates have appeared \63 times in the Washington Post and another 135 times in the New York 
Times."). 
143. 526 U.S. at 605--{)6. 
144. /d. at 615-16. 
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decision that dealt with the same issue. 145 Given such novelty, the Justices 
likely experienced less dissonance in finding a constitutional violation but 
granting immunity: the lack of precedent was simply a function of the new 
factual scenario, and the fact that reasonable officers failed to anticipate the 
decision could also be explained by the lack of prior guidance. 
Cognitive dissonance theory also accounts for the direction in which the 
constitutional issues that courts avoided pre-Saucier are resolved. One 
might contend that judges could also reduce dissonance by recognizing a 
constitutional violation and denying immunity. But as discussed in Part III, 
empirical evidence suggests that the proportion of cases in which courts 
deny qualified immunity has, if anything, decreased. 146 Why does this 
denial of violations predominate? 
Festinger termed the process of resolving dissonance "psychological 
work," explaining that such work will typically result in support of the 
cognition most resistant to change. 147 Here, the relevant subset of cases 
consists of those where previously courts would have avoided the 
constitutional question and simply granted immunity. It is a reasonable 
assumption that, within this set of cases, the immunity question is generally 
easy and the constitutional question difficult. Judges, therefore, are likely to 
have a clear intuition about the outcome of the immunity question. The 
greater level of certainty regarding the immunity determination makes the 
outcome on that issue, the cognition, more resistant to change. Under such 
circumstances, acknowledging a constitutional violation will inevitably 
intensify, rather than resolve; cognitive dissonance. Judges, it stands to 
reason, will instead lessen or avoid cognitive dissonance by denying that a 
constitutional violation occurred. 
Aside from the relative ease of the immunity determination in avoidance 
cases, other facets of qualified immunity jurisprudence also explain why 
dissonance is generally resolved in favor of the defendant. The Supreme 
Court has instructed that the qualified immunity issue should be resolved as 
early as possible in litigation 148-perhaps even on a motion to dismiss, 
before the plaintiff has had ample opportunity for discovery. This emphasis 
on early resolution means that these issues generally arise on the defendant's 
motion for dismissal or summary judgment on immunity grounds. The 
145. !d. at 616. 
146. See Appendix infra this. 3 & 4. 
147. In Festinger's words: "[T]here is a limit to the magnitude of dissonance which can exist in a 
system .... If the dissonance becomes greater than the resistance to change, then the least resistant 
elements of cognition will be changed, thus reducing the dissonance." FESTINGER, supra note 128, 
at 128-29. 
148. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,200 (2001); see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,227 
(1991) (per curiam) ("[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions 
at the earliest possible stage in litigation."). 
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court's initial focus, therefore, is on whether the defendant deserves 
immunity-not on the possibility that a constitutional violation occurred. 
This initial focus inevitably privileges the defendant's narrative. 149 As 
Professor Nahmod has explained, the judge makes the objective 
reasonableness determination "by reading the defendant's particularized 
narrative and imagining what it was like when she acted as she did under the 
circumstances confronting her." 150 And once the immunity question has 
been decided in favor of the defendant, cognitive dissonance theory suggests 
that the constitutional issue is likely to be decided the same way. 
One might expect that the Supreme Court would be less concerned 
about the implications of acknowledging a constitutional violation but 
granting qualified immunity. The Court has an inherent lawmaking 
function-indeed, grants of certiorari are often prompted by circuit splits, 
which by definition indicate a lack of clarity in the law, and so the Court is 
more accustomed to reaching the result it deems most appropriate where the 
law is unclear. The Supreme Court's role thus contrasts with that of the 
lower courts, whose responsibilities involve a mixture of articulating law 
and applying existing legal principles. Moreover, the Supreme Court is 
likely less concerned with lack of precedent for its result than are lower 
courts. Its decisions run no risk of being overturned, and no real 
consequences (aside, perhaps, from public excoriation) flow from reaching a 
result that is only minimally supported by precedent. But, as noted, even the 
Supreme Court has found a constitutional violation yet granted immunity 
only once, in Wilson v. Layne, where the novelty of the factual 
circumstances likely resulted in less dissonance for the Justices. 151 
The question remains: why should we care about the increased 
articulation of defendant-friendly law after Saucier? The sequencing 
approach is still functioning to articulate constitutional law, however 
unilaterally, thereby placing government officers and members of the public 
on notice of the relevant legal standards. But the forced articulation of 
constitutional principles has implications over time. When a court answers a 
constitutional question rather than saving that question for another day, it 
creates a new legal principle. In the process, the court recenters the legal 
149. Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in Section /983 Cases, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 819, 827-32 (1997) ("As a practical matter ... the plaintift's story is typically 
narrated in a barebones fashion .... And it is this barely told story, not fleshed out, that competes 
with the defendant's more elaborate and evidentiary narrative articulated in the qualified immunity 
setting."). 
150. !d. at 828-29. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 141-143. 
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regime in that area, altering expectations and changing the legal landscape 
for all future claims. 152 Professor Healy has described this process as a 
"domino effect," noting that "a ruling that a constitutional right does not 
exist authorizes government officials to engage in conduct they otherwise 
might have avoided." 153 
In the Fourth Amendment context, for example, police officers in most 
jurisdictions are trained that various restraint techniques are arrayed along a 
"continuum of force," with more severe uses of force appropriate only in 
more dangerous situations. 154 Consequently, a decision upholding the use of 
a particular technique-say, pepper spray-to physically subdue a 
recalcitrant suspect recenters the continuum, leading the judiciary, 
government officers, and the general public to view that technique as more 
acceptable. 155 In a future case involving a slightly more dangerous 
technique-a taser, perhaps 156-the question will not be decided on a blank 
slate, but will be decided in light of the previous case. But the previous case 
would not have been decided but for Saucier's sequencing requirement. 
Cognitive psychology offers a compelling explanation for the trend in 
law articulated as a result of Saucier. Regardless of the underlying 
mechanisms at work, however, the ensuing slow shift in the law over time 
raises serious concerns regarding the interplay between the sequencing 
approach and the articulation of constitutional law in the qualified immunity 
context. Under such circumstances, continued adherence to Saucier's 
mandate was inadvisable, and the Supreme Court thus correctly held in 
Pearson that sequencing take place at the court's discretion. 
152. Indeed, even attorneys may cite unpublished appellate cases in their briefs for their 
precedential or persuasive value in all but three circuits (the Second, Seventh, and Ninth). See 
ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED FEDERAL APPELLATE 
OPINIONS ISSUED BEFORE 2007 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Unpub_ 
Opinions. pdf. Courts, of course, may discuss or rely on any authority, published or unpublished, 
they find relevant and persuasive. 
153. Healy, supra note 10, at 933. 
154. See, e.g., Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 657 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Police tactics are classified 
along a 'force continuum' and ... the vascular neck restraint falls toward 'the harder or the more 
violent part' of this continuum, probably beyond pepper spray, at the 'point where you are using 
batons, or ... tasers."'); Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d 2, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that various 
techniques for subduing and restraining an arrestee are placed along a "Use of Force Continuum"). 
155. See Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200 (lOth Cir. 2007) (holding to be constitutional the use 
of pepper spray during a roadside stop after a female detainee took a cell phone call from her 
mother, refused to terminate the call on a police officer's command, and indicated that she did not 
wish to exit the car until her mother arrived because she was afraid of what the police officers would 
do if she exited the car). 
156. See Griffith, 473 F.3d. at 657; see also Covington v. Fairman, 123 F. App'x 738, 743 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (indicating that pepper spray is a less extreme use of force than is a taser). 
708 
[Vol. 36: 667, 2009] The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
After eight years of debate, the Supreme Court has now rejected 
Saucier's holding that the sequencing approach should be mandatory. The 
empirical evidence presented in this article, and the long-term skew in the 
law that would result from continued mandatory sequencing, add support for 
the result the Court reached. 
The Supreme Court revised Saucier by allowing courts to undertake 
sequencing at their discretion rather than at the Supreme Court's mandate. 
But it offered little guidance as to when courts should exercise that 
discretion. In my view, discretion need not and should not be arbitrary. 
Rather, the decision to decide the constitutional question should result from 
thoughtful assessment of two relevant factors: whether the constitutional 
issue is likely to be repeated without ever becoming more susceptible to 
review and whether the issue is adequately presented in the particular case, 
taking account of the procedural posture of the case, the corresponding 
thoroughness of the parties' briefing of the constitutional issue, and the level 
of factual development. If the constitutional question is unlikely to arise in a 
more appropriate posture for resolution, and the issue is adequately 
presented and briefed in the case at hand, then the court could proceed to 
rule on the constitutional issue. Otherwise, it could simply resolve the 
matter on qualified immunity grounds, saving the constitutional question for 
another day. Such an approach would at least partially address the concerns 
of those who argue that constitutional law will otherwise fail to evolve. But 
it would also avoid the forced articulation of constitutional law-and 
subsequent skew toward denial of constitutional rights--engendered by 
Saucier's mandatory sequencing approach. 
Despite the Court's decision to end the "Saucier experiment," we should 
remain mindful that the new approach it has prescribed has simply replaced 
that experiment with another. The goal of the new experiment is, as always, 
to balance the need to facilitate the development of the law with pragmatic 
concerns such as judicial economy and informed judicial decision making. 
And the success or failure of the new experiment inherently hinges on real-
world results, which must be assessed through the collection and analysis of 
empirical data. My ultimate hope, therefore, is that subsequent research will 
continue to monitor the effect of qualified immunity doctrine on the 
evolution of the law by examining the nature and quality of the law the 
doctrine facilitates. This article, then, is only the first stage of what must be 
an ongoing process of evaluating the procedures we espouse by examining 
the law those procedures produce. 
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Appendix: Numerical Tables Corresponding to Charts and Graphs 
Table 1: District court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed 
Pre- 105 28.6 5.7 65.7 (47.6 + 18.1) 
Siegert 
Pre- 106 20.8 7.6 71.7 (51.9 + 19.8) 
Saucier 
2006- 156 6.4 4.5 89.1 (69.9 + 19.2) 
2007 
Table 2: Appellate court claims where the defendant(s) prevailed 
Pre- 106 48.1 5.7 46.2 (31.1 + 15.1) 
Siegert 
Pre- 110 29.1 1.8 69.1 (62.7 + 6.4) 
Saucier 
2006- 113 6.2 8.8 84.9 (80.5 + 4.4) 
2007 
157. For an explanation of the numbers in parentheses, see supra note 100. 
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Pre- 161 18.6 
Siegert 
Pre- 165 13.3 
Saucier 
2006- 195 5.1 
2007 
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Table 3: All district court claims 
3.7 42.2 (30.4 + 32.3 3.1 
11.8) 
4.9 46.0 (33.3 + 32.7 3.0 
12.7) 
3.6 61.4 (56.0 + 14.4 5.6 
15.4) 
Table 4: All appellate court claims 
Pre- 144 35.4 4.2 34.0 (22.9 + 25.0 1.4 
Siegert 11.1) 
Pre- 144 22.2 1.4 52.8 (47.9 + 20.1 3.5 
Saucier 4.9) 
2006- 155 4.5 6.5 61.9 (58.7 + 26.5 0.7 
2007 3.2) 
158. For a description of this category, see supra Part IV.A. 
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Table 5: District court results by political party of appointing president 
Pre- 31.9 ' 13.5 1.9 48.0 (36.5 + 34.6 1.9 
Siegert 11.5) 
-D 
Pre- 68.1 20.7 4.5 39.6 (27.9 + 31.5 3.6 
Siegert 11.7) 
-R 
Pre- 46.7 18.2 4.0 33.8 (19.5 + 44.2 0.0 
Saucier 14.3) 
-D 
Pre- 49.7 7.3 6.1 57.3 (45.1 + 23.2 6.1 
Saucier 12.2) 
-R 
2006-- 39.0 9.2 5.3 67.1 (55.3 + 7.9 10.5 
2007 - 11.8) 
D 
2006-- 51.3 2.0 2.0 74.0 (54.0 + 19.0 3.0 
2007 - 20.0) 
R 
159. For the pre-Saucier and 2006--2007 time periods, the percentages do not add up to one 
hundred because a few decisions were made by magistrate judges, who are not politically appointed 
and whose political affiliation is therefore not known. 
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Table 6: Civil rights cases commenced in district court 1990-2007 
1990 18,914 25,992 44,906 
1991 19,892 26,042 45,934 
1992 24,233 30,555 54,788 
1993 27,655 33,933 61,588 
1994 32,622 39,065 71,687 
1995 36,600 41,679 78,279 
1996 42,007 41,215 83,222 
1997 43,278 28,632 71,910 
1998 42,354 26,461 68,815 
1999 41,304 25,694 66,998 
2000 40,908 25,504 66,412 
2001 40,910 24,118 65,028 
2002 40,420 23,964 64,384 
2003 40,516 24,073 64,589 
2004 40,239 23,449 63,688 
2005 36,096 24,614 60,710 
2006 32,865 24,239 57,104 
2007 31,756 24,025 55,781 
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Table 7: Published district and appellate court claims 
Pre- 28.3 35.1 3.9 29.3 3.7 
Siegert 
Pre- 11.4 51.0 3.4 29.5 4.7 
Saucier 
2006- 7.5 66.3 3.7 19.4 3.2 
2007 
Table 8: Unpublished district and appellate court claims 
Pre- 23.3 44.0 4.3 28.4 0 
Siegert 
Pre- 23.1 47.6 3.1 24.4 1.9 
Saucier 
2006- 3.9 69.5 3.5 19.5 3.5 
2007 
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